平和への高価な代償--カソリック協会と日本のナショナリズム、1926-1945 by Thompson Micheal
平和への高価な代償--カソリック協会と日本のナシ
ョナリズム、1926-1945
著者 Thompson Micheal
雑誌名 比較文化
巻 13
ページ 49-67
発行年 2007
URL http://id.nii.ac.jp/1106/00000036/
Comparative Culture, 13: 49-67, 2007
 The High Price of Peace: The Catholic Church and
Japanese Nationalism 1926-1945
Míchéal Thompson
MEP (société des missions etrangères de Paris)はフランスのカトリック教徒の伝道の社
会でした。1850年代にMEPは近代日本のカトリック教会を設立しました。当初
は、多くの問題がありましたが、日本のカトリック教会は 20世紀の初めまでに大い
に成長しました。昭和の最初の 20年は日本にとっては、過激な国家主義と戦争の時
代でした。MEPのカトリック教会と宣教師はこれらの諸問題に対処しなければなり
ませんでした。国家神道と日本人のカトリック教徒の司教への対応は特に重要な問
題でした。日本のカトリック教会は、バチカン市国の方針と、日本人の聖職者と、
MEPの間で分割されました。この論文はこの時代に日本のカトリック教会とMEP
によって採用された異なった戦略を検証します。カトリック教会がこの敵対的環境
で平和に生き残るのは、ひじょうに困難なものでした。
The MEP (société des missions-etrangères de Paris), a French Catholic missionary society,
had founded the Catholic Church in modern Japan in the 1850s. Despite many challenges the
Catholic Church in Japan had grown significantly by the beginning of the twentieth century.
The first twenty years of the Showa period, however, were a time of extreme nationalism and
war for Japan. The Catholic Church and particularly the missionaries of the MEP had to deal
with these pressures and especially with the issues of State Shinto and the indigenization of
the Japanese Catholic hierarchy. The MEP were caught between the policies of Vatican
diplomacy, the aspirations of the indigenous Japanese Clergy, and their own (often divided)
assessment of the situation. This article looks at the different strategies adopted by the
Catholic Church in Japan and the MEP in this period, and at the high price they both had to
pay to secure the peaceful survival of the Catholic Church in this often-hostile environment.
“On the occasion of the Fourth Assembly of the FABC, we, Catholic Bishops of Japan, as
Japanese and as members of the Catholic Church, sincerely ask forgiveness from God and
from our brothers and sisters of Asia and the Pacific for the tragedy brought by Japan
during World War II. As parties involved in the war we share in the responsibility for more
than 20 million victims in Asia and the Pacific. Furthermore we deeply regret having
damaged the lives and cultures of the people of these regions. The trauma is not healed yet”.
- Homily delivered by Archbishop Seiichi Shirayanagi, President of the Bishops' Conference
of Japan at the Eucharist celebrated on Sept. 21,1986 at the Cathedral of Tokyo.
ore than forty years after the end of hostilities in East Asia, the head of the
Catholic Church in Japan apologized for the support given by the Catholic
Church in Japan to the nationalist governments of the Japanese Empire
during the wartime period. Important though this long-delayed apology
undoubtedly was, it could not explore in any great depth the nature, extent, and
reasoning behind this complicity. Despite this apology, it was to be a further 13
years until, in a study released without fanfare (to say the least) that the Bishops’
Conference of Japan commented further on the background of this apology1. The
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current article will attempt to clarify the questions as to exactly what the attitude of
the Catholic Church in Japan was to Japanese nationalism in this period, how it
arrived at this position, and how it fitted with the more general attitude of the
Catholic Church throughout this very difficult period for the Church and the world.
Its primary point of reference is the role of the MEP (société des missions-etrangères de
Paris) as the principal Catholic missionary group active in Japan during this period.
The last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first three of the nineteenth
century were times of great difficulty for the Catholic Church and its institutions.
From the French Revolution through to the Kulturkampf, the attacks against the
Church seemed to come in endless waves. Each attack left the Church somewhat
more weakened and diminished in influence than it had been before. From the
perspective of Europe, this culminated in the final years of the pontificate of Pius IX
who died in 1878 a self-proclaimed ‘prisoner of the Vatican’ marooned in his papal
palace adrift on a hostile sea of republicanism, modernism, nationalism, and anti-
Catholicism. Without questioning much of the validity of this, the state of the
Catholic Church in the world as a whole was not quite so bleak and subsequent
popes were intent to capitalize on this. Above all, the successors to Pius IX
concentrated on two things: establishing the best possible basis for church-state
relations in Europe (despite the challenges) and fostering the work of the Church
outside of Europe. The former consisted in the creation of a long series of concordats
with European states which guaranteed the Catholic Church a privileged place in
the lives of these states, especially in such vital areas as education and family life;
the latter meant fostering the mission work of the Church and attempting to
separate the lives of these missions from the potentially hostile vagaries of European
politics. This in turn meant encouraging the growth of indigenous clergy and
hierarchies which, though strictly loyal to Rome, would be less and less dependent
on European missionaries. When the time was considered right, this could also lead
to the establishment of diplomatic and concordat relationships between the Holy
See and the governments of those mission countries that could be considered viable.
In most cases, of course, these mission countries were European colonies and, as
such, beyond the reach of individual concordats nevertheless preparations were
being made for the future.
Such papal policies carried with them several implicit and explicit
consequences. Firstly, if a government or regime were willing to accept a specific or
even a privileged role for the Church, the Popes in turn would be willing to work
with it. As such the specific variant of nationalism, imperialism, conservatism, etc
espoused by a government was of no significance. The statement of Jesus: “Render
unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s”
(Matthew 22:21) was frequently invoked. In that respect, the Popes saw themselves
as being neutral or above the fray. This, however, did not and could not extend to
regimes (above all Communist or Communist inspired ones) that rejected any role
for the Church at all. While prompted in part by bitter personal experience (such as
that of Achille Rato [the future Pius XI] in Warsaw and that of Eugenio Pacelli [the
future Pius XII] in Munich) the experiences of the Church in the Soviet Union,
Mexico, and Spain weighted the attitude of the Church heavily against dealing with
Communists and the Left more generally. Given the climate of the times, the
‘neutrality’ of the Church was of its nature less than perfectly neutral. This was
perhaps augmented by the fact that leading ‘democratic’ countries such as the
United Kingdom and the United States were hostile to the concept of concordats,
while the concordat of 1801 with France had been brutally severed by the French
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government. It is in this context that the relations of the Catholic Church with the
increasingly nationalist governments of Japan should be set. 
The Catholic Church in Japan in 1926
On Christmas Day, 1926, the Showa Era began with the accession to the
throne of the Emperor Hirohito whose father (the Emperor Taisho) had reigned
since 1912. The Catholic Church had been reestablished by French missionaries of
the MEP in 1859 and had been able to build on the hitherto forgotten survivals of
the sixteenth and seventeenth Portuguese and Spanish missionaries. The situation of
the Church in Japan had been regularized into two Vicariates (northern and
Southern Japan) in 1876 and then still further into four Arch/Dioceses in 1889. The
numbers of faithful were now in excess of 90,000 though 60% of the total were to be
found in the Archdiocese of Nagasaki in Kyushu where the legacy of the Iberian
missionaries was concentrated. The MEP, largely because of their own inability to
adequately staff the Church in Japan, had begun to progressively cede some of its
territories to other religious orders, beginning with the cession of Shikoku to the
Spanish Dominicans. This was finalized in 1904. The process of cession continued
with further areas in Hokkaido, Honshu, and Kyushu being reassigned to German
and Italian Catholic missionary societies. In 1926, however, the MEP still retained
their control of the Catholic Church in Japan with the two Archdioceses (Nagasaki
and Tokyo) and the two Dioceses of Osaka and Hakodate in their hands. The other
religious orders had to be content with Prefectures Apostolic (Shikoku, Niigata,
Nagoya, and Sapporo).
The control of the MEP had been, however, much contested at least since the
anti-clerical legislation of the French Third Republic and, furthermore, the cataclysm
of the First World War in Europe had undermined much of the claim to authority of
the society. The former had coincided with a massive drop in clerical recruitment to
the MEP and in a corresponding loss in financial contributions to the Oeuvre de la
propagation de la foi, which since the 1830’s had provided most of the funding for
French Catholic missionary ventures. These had affected the missions of the MEP
(and other French missionary societies) around the world. Specifically in Japan, the
role taken by France with respect to the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, and especially
the alliance of the French Third Republic with Czarist Russia prior to the Russo-
Japanese War of 1905, had placed France, and with it the MEP and (perhaps)
Catholicism in general, in a negative light. Briefly, the MEP in Japan had even been
in a virtual state of siege in many areas due to threats of violence against the
property and persons of the missionaries. While this overt hostility quickly abated,
Catholicism and especially the MEP remained to some degree suspect. The First
World War, on the other hand, had seen France and Japan as allies. The response of
the MEP and of the French Catholic Church in general had been a massive
outpouring of devotion and service to the patrie with missionaries serving in the
military not only as chaplains but also as regular soldiers. Undoubtedly this had
helped to heal some of the wounds of the early anti-clerical period in France itself
and had vindicated the loyalty of the Catholic Church to the state, but in Japan this
had served to underline both the ready acceptance of the MEP of the call to
patriotism, and the fact that this was to France and not to Japan. How patriotic was
the MEP and the Catholic Church in Japan to the Japanese nation and state?
If France had suffered major devastation and loss as a result of the First
World War (1.3 million dead, 740,000 maimed, 289,000 houses destroyed, and three
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million acres of agricultural land made unfit for cultivation)2, Japan had only
benefits from the war. At no cost in Japanese lives, Japan had acquired both new
territories and even greater influence in Asia and the Pacific. Apart from the Pacific
Islands mandates, Japan’s primary gains had been in China. In 1915, the Japanese
government under Prime Minster Shigenobu Okuma had succeeded in gaining
substantial concessions from a weakened Chinese government, even though the
United States had made it give up on some of its more extreme demands. In 1918,
Japanese Prime Minister Masatake Terauchi had negotiated a joint-defense treaty
with China in the light of the proposed threat from the nascent Soviet regime in
Russia. Using this treaty, and combining it with sending a substantial army
(eventually totaling 70,000) to Siberia as part of the Allied Expeditionary Force,
Japanese troops could be found in large areas of China3. A primary goal of post-war
Japanese governments was how to hold on to these gains (and exploit them) against
the probable opposition of the Western nations, especially the United States. France
wanted security and reparations for its losses; Japan wanted security and protection
for its gains. Neither was to be happy with what they got.
The Great Depression hit Japan, like France, hard though the onset was not as
delayed in Japan as it was in France4. In some respects, though, the Great
Depression in itself was of less significance because it was the last (or nearly the
last) in a series of economic crises that reached back to the immediate post-war
period. In fact, the 1920s is often referred to as a period of recurring panics of
greater or lesser magnitude. Financial crises, bank closures, bankruptcies, and job
losses were recurrent themes. Small companies were pushed to extinction, though
the big zaibatsu companies (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda) had the
reserves and government connections to weather these storms and retain or even
gain economic power. The composite of all these economic woes was a depression,
which was the worst in Japanese history. Much publicized were the roles of ‘dollar
speculators’ and Britain’s withdrawal from the Gold Standard, which added to
Japan’s woes. It seemed that these might be linked to foreign displeasure with
Japan’s foreign policies. This strengthened the claims of the nationalists and the
army as to who the enemies actually were and of the necessity (and rightness) of
adopting a policy of aggression in China and other parts of Asia. Nationalism (and
the army) appeared to have the right formula to restore Japan’s economy, and
therefore its self-respect, while protecting Japan from exploitative foreigners who
wanted to restrict the country’s role in Asia.
Of course, there was much more to Japanese attitudes as the Japanese moved
through the 1920s into the 1930s than economics. Other nations, like France,
explored a variety of different responses to economic depression and social
uncertainty. As discussed earlier, successive Japanese governments from the middle
of the Meiji period had been concerned as to what the best social policies were that
would both minimize social conflict, and maximize a sense of common purpose
(and obedience) in their citizens. They were determined to minimize the influence
of socialism and other radical ideas. The Great Treason Trial (1911) was the final
death knell for the desperately small Anarchist movement in Japan, and the start of
the Soviet Revolution in Russia (with the Japanese sending an Expeditionary Army
to Siberia to combat it) ensured that Communism would have no foothold in Japan.
2 J.P.T. Bury, France 1814-1940 (London, 1985) 244.
3 Ikuhiko Hata ‘Continental Expansion 1905-1941’ in The Cambridge History of Japan Volume
6: The Twentieth Century Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Peter Duus (ed.).
4 Takafusa Nakamura ‘Depression, recovery, and war, 1920-1945’ in Duus (ed.) (1988).
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But it was obvious that there was a need, not just to repress unwelcome social
tendencies, but also to establish (and enforce) positive ones, particularly
nationalism. An increasingly important aspect of this was religion. While Buddhism
could be relied upon to support the nationalist agenda and, since the 1890s and
especially since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, had regularly done so, more was
needed. The hostility towards Buddhism in some areas and its virtual absence in
others (for example Amami-Oshima) made it a useful adjunct, but not a perfect
instrument. That instrument could only be found in State Shinto and, since that
same war, Japanese governments had increasingly honed it and put it to this use. 
State Shinto and the Catholic Church in Japan: The First Stage
This was a major problem for some, especially Catholics, who viewed Shinto
as not just a demonstration of non-religious patriotism, but as an alternative religion
to their own. This potential for conflict had nearly come to a head during the First
World War. In 1915 the Governor of Nagasaki had initiated a formal conversation
with Bishop Combaz5 about this issue. Despite the contentions of the Governor that
the State Shinto shrines and rites were solely civil and not religious, Bishop Combaz
reiterated the ban on Catholic participation in a pastoral letter of 1916. The Vatican’s
Office of Propaganda Fide dispatched Monsignor Petrelli6 to Tokyo to smooth things
over bearing an official letter of felicitations to the Emperor. However, Bishop
Combaz was unconvinced, declaring in 1918: ‘We regret exceedingly that as
Catholics we cannot accept the interpretation of shrine worship given by the
government nor can we visit the shrines and engage in the services for the dead nor
can we ever pay respect to the so-called gods’7. There the matter rested, the
government adamant that shrine observance should be mandatory of all loyal
Japanese though protesting that it was non-religious, the MEP adamant that it was
religious and therefore not possible for Catholics though protesting the loyalty of
the Catholic Church in Japan to the state. 
The visit of Monsignor Petrelli, however, was a sign of things to come with
the establishment of direct relations between the Vatican and Japan and the
residence of Monsignor Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi8 as Apostolic Delegate from 1919 to
1921. This Apostolic Delegation was also to include the Japanese Imperial territories
of Korea and Taiwan, thus pragmatically accepting the realities of Japanese
Imperialism. From his elevation to Cardinal in 1933 to his death in 1960, Fumasoni-
Biondi was the Prefect of the Congregation Propaganda Fide and so a key influence
on Japanese-Vatican relations throughout this period. The inauguration of direct
diplomatic links meant, though the MEP in Japan only slowly incorporated this fact,
that issues to do with State Shinto were now to be handled through the Apostolic
Delegate (and thus the Vatican) rather than through the diocesan bishops (and thus
the MEP). It was, in part at least, a realistic recognition of the centrality of the
Vatican to Catholicism and equally a recognition of the loss of French claims to
5 Jean Combaz was born in the Archdiocese of ChambŽry in December 1856. He died in
Nagasaki in 1926.
6 Joseph Petrelli was born in the Marche in 1873. He was a curial official from 1915 until
his death in 1962.
7 George Minamiki, The Chinese Rites Controversy from its Beginning to Modern Times
(Chicago, 1985) 130.
8 Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi was born in Rome in 1872. He was elevated to Cardinal and
became Prefect of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in 1933. He died in
office in 1960.
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represent the Catholic Church in Asia. Though a barely noticed change, it was to
prove an important one.
The first move of Bishop Fumasoni-Biondi’s successor as Apostolic Delegate
(Monsignor Mario Giardini9), which impacted on this issue, was the calling of the
second provincial synod in 1924 (the first had been held in 1895). It was not to offer
much in the way of a solution to the impasse concerning State Shinto in which the
Catholic Church in Japan now found itself. Clearly the desires of the Apostolic
Delegate and the Japanese clergy were not entirely commensurate with those of the
MEP. A compromise between these two positions was sought and the resulting
documents reflect this10. Basically, certain acts of ‘passive’ or solely ‘material’
participation in certain shrine rites could be tolerated (tolerari potest in accordance
with Canon 1258) especially for soldiers or government workers but ‘signs of
reverence’ could not. The acts of reverence for the war dead were prohibited
(despite some disagreement) because of their continuing religious nature. Catholic
students in state schools were not allowed ‘material’ participation in any form.
While hope was held out for the future when all State Shinto rites would lose their
religious or quasi-religious character, the synod could not reach agreement and they
could not see their way to deciding upon a common guideline (Communis autem
regula nulla ratione statui posse videtur)11. Even this limited compromise, inadequate
from both the Japanese and the Apostolic Delegate’s perspective, was not well
received in certain quarters. The section of the synod documents dealing with State
Shinto, because they involved questions of faith, were separated from the other
documents and forwarded to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office for
consideration. 
While Propaganda Fide wanted a quick, realistic decision to help the Japanese
church in an increasingly nationalistic and militaristic environment, the Holy Office
had no such concerns but wanted to preserve the integrity of its decisions of the
eighteenth century concerning the Chinese Rites. So, nothing happened and the
Japanese Catholic Church remained divided and highly suspect in the eyes of the
authorities. In 1931, a new Apostolic Delegate (Bishop Edward Mooney12) took
office and, instead of waiting for some kind of response from the Holy Office,
decided to call a new synod. In doing so, he did not just express his own and
Propaganda Fide’s sense of urgency about the situation, but also the fact that a new
synod would reflect the changes in the Japanese Catholic Church since the last
synod. Propaganda Fide had taken action in Japan that changed the balance of
power in the synod; the process of indigenization of the hierarchy had begun. Any
documents coming out of this new synod would reflect these changes.
The Indigenization of the Hierarchy: The First Stage
The MEP (and Propaganda Fide) had always been clear that one of the goals of
the mission was to lay the foundations for what would become self-governing
9 Mario Giardini was born in Milan in December 1877. He became Archbishop of Ancona
in 1931. He resigned in 1940 and died in 1947.
10 The documents of this synod were never published, this account of the documents relies
on the summary found in George Minamiki The Chinese Rites Controversy Chicago:
Loyola University, 1985 and on Josef Metzler, Die Synoden in China, Japan und Korea: 1570-
1931 (Paderborn, 1980) 268-292.
11 Metzler (1980) 283-284.
12 Edward Mooney was born in Maryland in 1882 and was ordained in 1909. He became
Archbishop of Detroit in 1937 and was made a Cardinal in 1946. He died in 1958.
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dioceses under indigenous Bishops. The question was how to judge when the time
was right for this transition to take place. How self-sufficient did a prospective
diocese have to be? How could you know when the indigenous clergy were ready to
take control? In normal circumstances these decisions would be difficult ones to
make, but Japan in the 1920s could not be considered ‘normal’. However, it was this
very lack of normality that pushed Propaganda Fide who in turn pushed the MEP
into urgent consideration of action. The obvious first choice for such an action was
the Diocese of Nagasaki, the jewel in the MEP’s crown and, for that reason if for no
other, likely to be a contentious choice. The MEP had in fact initiated a Japanese
administered area in the diocese (the Goto Islands) during the war but some in the
MEP (including Fr. Fernand Thiry13) were convinced that it had had negative effects
both in terms of administration and religion14. Despite this skepticism, the MEP was
in no position to block the decision that had been clearly made by Propaganda Fide
(and thus by Pope Pius XI). 
Initially, Bishop Combaz at least appeared to think that the MEP was about to
cede Hakodate to another religious society (as had been done with Sapporo in 1915)
and pleaded with the Superior General of the MEP (Bishop Guébriant)15 to keep the
rest of the MEP’s territories ‘together and not separate them one by one to another
congregation, especially of a different nationality’16. The visit of the Apostolic
Delegate (Fumasoni-Biondi) to Nagasaki made him begin to accept that the plans of
the Vatican might be otherwise. Bishop Combaz was acutely aware of the fact that
Fumasoni-Biondi had only been in Japan a short while and did understand in depth
the ‘numerous obstacles opposing the conversion of the Japanese or the
government’s attitude to the Catholic religion’. He implies that the Apostolic
Delegate was caught up ‘in the middle of Japanese obsequiousness’. He also noted
the visit of the Prince Imperial (soon to be Emperor Hirohito) to the Vatican at the
same time as Fumasoni-Biondi was on tour in Japan17. He soon made the connection
however and realized that Vatican backed change was on the way in Japan
whatever he might have preferred to. But what change and how much were still
unanswered questions at the end of 1920, that was not to remain the case for long.
By the following year, Bishop Combaz realized that two alternative, though
inter-related plans were under discussion. One was the further sub-division of the
diocese with parts of it going to other mission societies. The other was the erection
of a diocese under a Japanese Bishop. Yet it was still not clear to Bishop Combaz and
the other MEP in Japan as to how these two were related, what exactly was meant,
and what the timetable would be. During the course of 1921, it became apparent
that Propaganda Fide had approved the transference of part of the diocese to the
Canadian Franciscans18. The Salesians of Don Bosco were also encouraged by the
Apostolic Delegate to take on a mission independent from the MEP in part of the
13 Fr. Fernand Thiry was born in September 1884. He was Vicar General to Bishop Combaz.
Nominated Bishop of Fukuoka in 1927, he died in 1930.
14 Letter of Fr. Thiry to MEP 06/07/1926 he is writing on behalf of Bishop Combaz who
was too sick to write himself. MC [Missionary Correspondence] 571a (1926).
15 Jean-Baptiste Budes de Guébriant was born in December 1860 to a distinguished Breton
family. In 1921 he was chosen as Superior General of the MEP in which capacity he
served until his death in 1935.
16 Letter of Bishop Combaz 02/22/1920 in MC 571a (1920).
17 MC 571a (1920).
18 Comptes Rendus (1921).
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diocese19. Initially, in 1921, the Canadian Franciscans were sent to Kagoshima, which
was expected to be their new mission territory. But Kagoshima on its own was
relatively unpromising territory for them, so they worked towards extending the
territorial base of their proposed independent mission. Their primary goal, once
they realized the lie of the land, was to take possession of the flourishing mission of
Amami-Oshima20. Finally, it was ‘agreed’ that the Franciscans would have
Kagoshima (including Amami-Oshima), Miyazaki, Oita, and Kumamoto
prefectures21. Though the MEP missionaries in Nagasaki Diocese were not happy
about the loss of Amami-Oshima, they would have been happier if this loss had
been counter-balanced by the loss of less fertile mission territory as well (such as
Kagoshima, Miyazaki, and Oita). They didn’t want to have another missionary
society ‘take the jam and leave them with the dry bread’22. There was also some
division about whether ceding Kumamoto was appropriate in geographical and
transportation terms. If the four prefectures were to be ceded to the Franciscans,
what was to be ceded to the Salesians and who was responsible for making the final
decision?
The provisional head of the Canadian Franciscan mission in Japan (Fr.
Maurice Bertin), though willing to keep Kagoshima Prefecture in its entirety, wished
to shift the center of the new mission to Amami-Oshima. He was also content that
the Salesians should have Oita and one other Prefecture, and therefore
recommended that Miyazaki as well should be added to the Salesian mission23. This
would leave Kumamoto Prefecture as territory to be decided. But the Superior
General of the Canadian Franciscans disagreed with Fr. Bertin and wanted to keep
Miyazaki Prefecture for his order. This would mean a Franciscan mission of two
prefectures (Kagoshima and Miyazaki) and a Salesian mission of two prefectures
(Oita and Kumamoto). There was understandable opposition to this on the part of
the MEP in Japan24. One part of this opposition centered on how the decision on this
division would be made, Article 19 of the MEP rules stipulated that the society itself
should make these decisions while Article 39 noted that it should be the Holy See25.
Concerns ran so high that Fr. François Bertrand26 (claiming to represent six other
MEP missionaries) went over Bishop Combaz’ head to write directly to the MEP in
Paris about the proposed division27. These concerns were communicated to Bishop
Combaz very shortly thereafter following a meeting of the Missionary Council. The
missionaries made it clear that they wished to ‘keep something at least equal to
other societies’28. In the end, the MEP intervened with Propaganda Fide to insure
that the MEP would retain Kumamoto Prefecture (along with Saga and Fukuoka
Prefectures), so which of the two articles applied was never truly clarified. The only
thing that the MEP in Japan was definitely sure about is that they must maintain
19 Letter of Bishop Combaz to MEP 23/09/1923 MC 571a (1923).
20 Comptes Rendus (1921).
21 Comptes Rendus (1923).
22 MC 571a (1921).
23 MC 571a (1924).
24 Correspondence of 28/07/1924 and 16/08/1924 (Fr. Lemarie) in MC 571a (1924).
25 Correspondence of 28/06/1923 in MC 571a (1923).
26 Fr. François Bertrand was born in August 1866. Following a long illness, he died in
February 1940 at Yatsuhiro.
27 Fr. Bertrand to MEP 07/12/1923 in MC 571a (1923).
28 23/09/1923 MC 571a (1923).
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Fukuoka, as it was the only larger settlement in the three prefectures at the time. In
the smaller towns in the countryside ‘everyone is enrolled in Shinto-Buddhist
associations’ and it was ‘difficult if not impossible’ for the missionaries to get
results. One the other hand, ‘towns of 15,000 to 20,000 and above have more liberty,
more independence, and are more open to Christian ideas’ so that ‘there at least we
advance slowly but surely’29. One thing that made the discussion even sharper was
the realization that Fumasoni-Biondi had promised that there would be a Japanese
Diocesan Bishop during his visit in 1921 and that Propaganda Fide were intent on
delivering on that promise. The Diocese of Nagasaki was to be taken out of the
hands of the MEP and given to the Japanese clergy.
In 1926, the die was cast and it was made clear that the Apostolic Delegate
(Bishop Mario Giardini) with the authority of Propaganda Fide was intent on
implementing the transition to a Japanese controlled diocese in Nagasaki as soon as
possible. Bishop Combaz seems to have been largely accepting of the project,
though he was too sick to take part in the practical discussions leading to
implementation. In fact, the scheme was of necessity postulated on his no longer
being the Bishop of Nagasaki. In fact, because of ill health, he died in August 1926,
and there was no need to discuss his demission. That did not mean, however, that it
would be plain sailing to transfer the diocese into Japanese hands. Fr. Thiry (as
Vicar General) led the charge against the intentions of Propaganda Fide. While he
would have been a natural successor to Bishop Combaz (and did become the first
Bishop of Fukuoka) there is no real reason to think that his attempts to counter the
transition were motivated by personal factors; rather his concerns were with the
continued smooth functioning of the diocese and with the timing and
appropriateness of the change. 
His primary contention was that Propaganda Fide was attempting to move too
fast without adequately considering the situation in the diocese. While ultimately
there was no doubt that the diocese should have a Japanese bishop, now was not the
time and, not only that, there was in fact no pressure (he believed) from the
Japanese clergy to make this change at this time. He wrote that ‘the healthy (saine)
majority of the Japanese clergy of Nagasaki are completely opposed to any
precipitate action in this matter’. He went on to note that Propaganda Fide and the
MEP in Paris should be aware that the Japanese clerical administration of the Goto
Islands had been ‘a setback in religious and administrative terms’ irrespective of
what had been officially reported in the Comptes rendus. The correct solution was a
new MEP Bishop of Nagasaki Diocese to be followed by the division of the diocese
at a later time30. Implicit here was the idea that Bishop Combaz had ‘gilded the lily’
somewhat in his official reports on the Goto Islands and that this had moved
Propaganda Fide to adopt a more favorable stance towards indigenization of the
diocesan administration. He further noted the opposition of the missionaries based
on the lack of adequate numbers of priests, there being no suitable candidate for
Bishop among the Japanese clergy, and the problems of administrative competence
(or the lack of it) noted in the Gotos31. He also raised the more ‘personal’ problems
of the missionaries many of whom were ‘more or less aged’ and, though they had
years of experience, found that the current disruptions had diminished ‘the fire of
enthusiasm of their youth’. They were, after all, ‘still men’ which meant that the
29 07/12/1923 MC 571a (1923).
30 06/07/1926 MC 571a (1926).
31 22/07/1926 MC 571a (1926).
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current situation was very bad for the morale of the MEP missionaries in Nagasaki
Diocese32.
The main problem, however, for Fr. Thiry and the other MEP missionaries
that he represented, was more to do with the inadequacies of the Japanese clergy
than the reluctance of the French clergy. Of the 29 Japanese clergy of the diocese,
seven were over 60 and three of them were over 70. A further three were assigned to
the seminary and thus not engaged in parochial work while another two could ‘only
be employed very discretely’ because of ‘very delicate reasons’. Stretching logic
perhaps a little too far (given the practice of the Catholic Church in general not least
in France) ‘nearly all of them were from the prefecture which meant keeping them
in the same prefecture could be a source of grave moral difficulties’33. Based on this,
he suggested a European Bishop for the diocese as a whole with a Japanese
Auxiliary Bishop with special charge of the Gotos, Hirado, Kuroshima, and
Sasebo34. 
Despite this spirited, and perhaps reasonable, opposition, Fr. Thiry was soon
made aware of its irrelevance. In December 1926 he received a letter from Bishop
Giardini ‘in the name of the Pope’ (sub sigillo pontificio) that the decision had been
made and that a Japanese Bishop for the whole Diocese of Nagasaki would be
appointed. All that was required of the MEP missionaries were nominations for the
episcopate35. Despite two previous votes against the proposal, the opposition of the
MEP missionaries was of no avail. The somewhat desperate appeal of Fr. Thiry to
have a ‘temporary double administration’ with the MEP retaining the seminary was
clearly beside the point by this time36. Other than nominations, the only things left
for the MEP were to plan their exit from Nagasaki (and its timing) and to set about
creating a viable new diocese in Fukuoka. 
The MEP in Japan nominated Fr. Moriyama and Fr. Urakawa, both of whom
were rejected in favor of the choice of Propaganda Fide (Fr. Kyunosuke Hayasaka).
However, Fr. Michael Urakawa did become Bishop of Sendai in 194137. At least Fr.
Hayasaka was not a native of Nagasaki but of Sendai, so one of Fr. Thiry’s concerns
at least had been addressed. The suggestion was made by the MEP in Paris that the
missionaries might wish to stay on in the Diocese of Nagasaki at least for a period of
transition, but that was rejected because ‘though the Europeans have enough
humility to stay in their posts, the Japanese don’t have enough to let them’38. Fr.
Thiry acted as one would expect him to act and accepted the decision of Propaganda
Fide as final and thus beyond discussion, reiterating the old maxim that ‘Rome has
spoken, discussion is closed’ (Roma locuta, causa finita). Despite some continuing
resistance and rearguard action (‘intrigues and deceptions’) the rest of the MEP
complied as well39. The Sisters of the Infant Jesus of Chauffailles notified Fr. Thiry of
their unwillingness to leave their novitiate under Japanese direction, but that was
32 23/07/1926 MC 571a (1926).
33 07/10/1926 MC 571a (1926).
34 15/12/1926 MC 571a (1926).
35 23/12/1926 MC 571a (1926).
36 10/05/1927 MC 571a (1927).
37 Bishop Michael Urakawa was born in April 1876. He served in Nagasaki for 35 years
until he became Bishop of Sendai in 1941. He retired in 1954 and died in the following
year.
38 10/05/1927 MC 571a (1927).
39 24/11/1927 MC 571a (1927).
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the end of the trouble40. Fr. Thiry asked for and received additional financial aid
from Paris for purchasing land and building new churches as the ‘work of
evangelization and other existing works had slowed down because of a lack of
resources’41. He was ordained Bishop of Fukuoka in December 1927, though his was
not to be a long tenure of office. In July 1927, Fr. Hayasaki Kyunosuke42 became the
first Japanese Bishop of Nagasaki.
The reasons for over-riding the objections of the MEP in Japan and for swiftly
executing the policy of indigenizing the ‘flagship’ Diocese of Nagasaki are not
difficult to discern. Pope Pius XI was acutely aware of the dangers of modern
nationalism to the Catholic Church in Europe and throughout the world. He was
seconded in this by his Secretaries of State (Cardinal Pietro Gasparri [1922-1930]43
and Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli [1930-1939])44. The Vatican believed that the best way
to secure the best position for the Church was through direct negotiations with
national governments with the aim of achieving detailed written agreements
(preferably Concordats) with them, which would provide guarantees for the
Catholic Church at the national level. From 1916, and especially from 1919, the
Vatican had been working towards this end in Japan with increasing urgency, as
nationalism appeared to increase in strength. To achieve this goal, in Japan as
elsewhere, would mean some concessions to ‘give a mark of respect and show
confidence in the government’45. It was even felt that not to do so might lead to a
schism or the creation of a ‘National’ Catholic Church in Japan46. How viable a
threat this was must remain an open question, but it was not a question that the
Vatican wished to leave open. Schismatic breakaways from the Catholic Church that
rejected the authority of the Papacy had been a feature of Catholic life in Europe
since the time of the Jansenists47. They were especially prominent at the time of the
First Vatican Council in 1870 in the Netherlands and parts of German speaking
Europe. Such schisms were not, however, restricted to Europe as the Polish National
Catholic Church (in the United States) and the Aglipayan Church (in the
Philippines) demonstrated. However, although it may have been an empty threat, it
was not one that could be dismissed summarily by the Pope or by Propaganda Fide.
It was also a question that was to recur over the next few years as the position of the
Catholic Church in Japan became even more precarious in the face of the rising tide
of extreme nationalism.
State Shinto and the Indigenization of the Hierarchy: Stage Two
Since the end of the First World War, the MEP in Japan had been in a very
difficult financial position due to inflation and a collapsing exchange rate, which
40 15/07/1927 MC 571a (1927).
41 12/10/1927 MC 571a (1927).
42 Bishop Hayasaka was born in Sendai in 1883. He was appointed Bishop of Nagasaki in
1927 at the age of 43. He resigned in 1937 and died in 1959.
43 Cardinal Pietro Gasparri was born in May1852. He was elevated to Cardinal in 1907 and
became Secretary of State in 1914. He retired in 1930 and died in 1934.
44 Cardinal Pacelli was born in March in March 1876. He became Secretary of State in 1930
and was elected as Pope Pius XII in 1939. He died in 1956.
45 Comptes Rendus (1927).
46 23/06/1926 MC 571a (1926).
47 John Neale, History of the So-Called Jansenist Church of Holland (New York, 1958).
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made things very difficult everywhere perhaps especially in Tokyo48. The
comparatively low level of missionary departures (averaging 20 a year or less in
both the 1920s and 1930s) meant that there was a growing shortage of MEP
missionaries and Japan had no special claim above that of other missions. Further
territorial concessions were made to other missionary societies; in 1922 the Diocese
of Nagoya was carved out of the Tokyo Archdiocese and given to the German based
Divine Word Missionaries. In 1923, the Diocese of Hiroshima was created out of the
western part of the Diocese of Osaka and assigned to German Jesuits. By 1930, the
number of MEP priests had fallen by nearly 20% compared with prewar levels and
they represented exactly half of the number of foreign Catholic missionaries. They
had experience on their side but increasingly little else and even that was starting to
ebb away. In Kyushu in the same year in the final deal agreed to by Propaganda Fide,
Kagoshima was entrusted to the Canadian Franciscans (including the fertile mission
field of Amami Oshima), and the Italian Salesians of Don Bosco took over the
decidedly less promising territory of Miyazaki. The granting of Nagasaki to the
indigenous clergy was clearly in response to the nationalist mood of the times and
was a demonstration of ‘confidence in the (Japanese) government’49. As a concession
it was a major one but, in the increasingly radicalized environment of the 1930s in
Japan, it was not enough. It became clear that what was expected was the handing
over of all of the Catholic dioceses to Japanese control. If foreign missionaries were
to be tolerated at all, they could certainly not be tolerated when they were in charge
of Japanese. It seemed to some (especially the Apostolic Delegates) that the future of
the Catholic Church in Japan was at stake, while to at least some of the missionaries
the mere survival of the institution was perhaps a high price to pay for giving up
the principles upon which the MEP had built up the mission at such great cost. At
the time, however, there was little scope for an in depth discussion to take place.
The Manchurian Incident of 1931 was the active beginning of the Greater East
Asia War. The army (and the navy) increasingly influenced all of the decisions of the
government. With the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in May 1932,
civilian government virtually ended in Japan. The Japanese nation was put on a
permanent war footing and all sectors of the economy were directed at the war
effort. To mobilize a nation and to keep it mobilized is not an easy task since an
accessible set of beliefs and practices, which are inclusive of all the people of the
nation need to be put into place and maintained. In Japan, this set of beliefs and
practices was to be found in State Shinto. The military-based governments were
intent on imposing State Shinto throughout Japan and, in fact, throughout the
Japanese Empire, and so the Catholic Church had to deal with this. It was a matter
of urgency and it would no longer be possible to let the decision disappear into the
files of the Holy Office. The transfer of Nagasaki Diocese had proved the
willingness on the part of the Pope to make reasonable compromises for a greater
good, now was the time to consider State Shinto.
Matters came to a head in May 1932, just before the assassination of Prime
Minister Inukai. A group of sixty Sophia University students had been led on a
march as part of the compulsory military training program. When they reached
Yasukuni Shrine they were required to present arms as a show of homage to the war
dead, but two or three Catholic students refused to do so50. In response, the Army
48 Rapport annual des évêques (Tokyo, 1921).
49 Comptes Rendus 1927.
50 This account is based on Minamiki (1985) who in turn used an unpublished account of
the affair written Fr. von Küenburg the Rector of Sophia University.
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Ministry threatened to cancel the position of military training officer at the school,
which would have effectively meant its closure. Bishop Ross, the new German Jesuit
Bishop of Hiroshima, intervened with a more liberal interpretation of the rules
(Canon 1258) governing these matters51. Archbishop Chambon52 of Tokyo agreed to
go along with this and permission was granted ‘by word of mouth and for this
instance’ (mündlich und pro casu) for Sophia students to perform homage at shrines
pending a decision of all of the ordinaries. As the next synod was not scheduled
until 1934, Archbishop Chambon wrote directly to the Ministry of Education
requesting clarification of the purpose and meaning to be attached to shrine visits.
They replied that the ‘bow that is required of the group of students of the higher
schools and the students of the middle and primary schools has no other purpose
than that of manifesting the sentiments of patriotism and loyalty’53. This was
sufficient for the Apostolic Delegate (Monsignor Edward Mooney) to issue his
approval, which the synod of 1934 then approved in its turn. In 1935, the then
Apostolic Delegate (Monsignor Paolo Marella54) requested revisions of the previous
guidelines governing shrine visits from Propaganda Fide. The reply, in the form of an
instruction (Pluries instanterque), was issued by the Prefect of Propaganda Fide
(Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi, a previous Apostolic Delegate to Japan). It was
declared lawful for Catholics to attend and participate in shrine ceremonies since
they were solely of a ‘civil nature’. Catholics could also take part in other private
rites (funerals, weddings, etc), which had also lost their religious nature. The norms
given in these instructions were not just recommendations; Bishops were required
(debere) to observe them. The final seal was placed on this in February 1937 when
Monsignor Marella and the new Archbishop Designate of Tokyo (Archbishop Takeo
Doi55) visited the Yasukuni Shrine along with a number of Catholic clergy and laity.
Perhaps an even more tangible symbol of the acquiescence of the indigenous led
Catholic Church in Japan was the campaign, launched by the first Japanese Bishop
of Nagasaki (Bishop Hayasaka) to purchase a military plane to be donated to the
government to demonstrate “Catholic patriotism”. Under considerable pressure
undoubtedly, the policy strictly adhered to by the MEP since its arrival in Japan and
ably defended just a few years before, had been overturned. The nature of Shinto
rites, the separation of Religion and the State, and the relationship of the Catholic
Church to them remains a debate to the present day56.
At the Yasukuni visit in 1937, Archbishop Doi led the Catholic clergy at the
shrine visit, and the MEP had been pushed into further concessions. Very shortly
more were to come. As the nationalist and militarist hold on the country deepened,
the Japanese government was getting impatient with the slow rate of change
towards Japanese control of the Catholic Church in Japan. The first move designed
to hasten the process came in 1936 when the Canadian Franciscans withdrew under
51 Codex iuris canonici (Rome, 1909).
52 Jean-Baptiste Chambon was born in March 1875. He became Archbishop of Tokyo in
1927. On the division of the diocese in 1937 he became Bishop of Yokohama. He
surrendered his diocese in 1940 and retired. He died in Japan and in 1948.
53 Minamiki (1985) 145.
54 Paolo Marella was born in Rome in 1895. He was appointed to the Roman Curia and
elevated to be a Cardinal in 1959. He retired in 1983 and died in the following year.
55 Archbishop Peter Doi was born in 1892 and ordained in 1921. In 1937 he was appointed
Archbishop of Tokyo. He was elevated to Cardinal in 1960 and died in 1970.
56 Matsumoto Saburo ‘The Roman Catholic Church in Japan’ in Kumazawa Yoshinobu and
David Swain [eds] Christianity in Japan, 1971-1990 (Tokyo, 1990).
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considerable pressure and a Japanese Administrator Apostolic (Fr. Paul
Yamaguchi)57 was appointed. The center of the Kagoshima mission was the island of
Amami-Oshima, which the MEP had been reluctant to concede to another
missionary society because the rate of conversions had been so high. Amami-
Oshima was declared a militarily sensitive zone and all foreigners were excluded
which spelt the end of the mission. Where the charge of being ruled by foreigners
was most galling was in the capital city of Tokyo. Archbishop Chambon was only
sixty in 1935 and in good health so there was a problem with waiting for time to
take its course. In 1937, the Archdiocese was divided with the MEP (under Bishop
Chambon) keeping the new Diocese of Yokohama58 while the Japanese clergy took
control of Tokyo itself. The final blow would come in 1940 when all the foreign
ordinaries were required to give up their sees to Japanese clergy, a process that was
complete by 1941. As Japan entered the latest and, as it turned out, final stage of the
war, the Catholic Church in Japan was solely led by Japanese and more fully
integrated into the ‘national project’ than ever before.
The Final Stage: The Catholic Church in Japan 1940-1945 
It was against this background of war and nationalism that the final decision
was made to indigenize all the Japanese dioceses and to do it immediately. It is
worth reiterating that the MEP, along with Propaganda Fide, had made clear all along
their commitment to eventual indigenization. The problems lay with the word
‘eventual’. Was the Catholic Church in Japan truly ready to ‘stand on its own feet’?
Did it have enough motivation? Was the decision to indigenize a reflection of the
readiness and maturity of the Catholic Church in Japan or was the decision based on
real politik, which in turn might indicate a fundamental unreadiness? Clearly, the
decision no longer rested with the MEP, even in an advisory capacity, and
Propaganda Fide had reached a decision. Whatever doubts could legitimately be
entertained over this decision, it was not without its supporters. Both important
elements of the Japanese clergy and some of the non-MEP heads of mission were
strongly in its favor since they were convinced of both its timeliness and its
appropriateness. However, some among the MEP, most notably Bishop Castanier of
Osaka, remained unconvinced and instituted some delaying action that gave some
color and tension to the final stages of the process.
Archbishop Doi of Tokyo was responsible for orchestrating the final
demission of the non-Japanese Bishops and heads of missions. Initially it seemed
that the plan was for a piecemeal series of demissions beginning with the dioceses
of Hiroshima, Kyoto, and Osaka and then proceeding to the others and
circumstances permitted. This was the plan communicated to Bishop Castanier by
the Apostolic Delegate (Monsignor Marella) in September 1940. He noted the
agreement of Bishop Chambon to this but shared his unhappiness over the decision:
‘You understand well that it’s neither Rome nor me who requires this, but our
shared resolution to agree to all the sacrifices (necessary) to save whatever can be
saved in this Church’59. Bishop Castanier replied noting his own wish to remain as
Bishop, but acknowledging the government’s clear intention of replacing foreigners
with Japanese Bishops especially in the major towns. He believed that the decision
57 Paul Yamaguchi was born in 1894 and ordained in 1923. He was appointed Bishop of
Nagasaki in 1937. He became the first Archbishop of Nagasaki in 1959. He retired in 1971
and died in 1976.
58 The Diocese of Yokohama was to be divided again very shortly afterwards (in 1937-1939)
when the Prefecture Apostolic of Urawa (now the Diocese of Sendai) was created and
given to the Canadian Franciscans.
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should rest with Rome, and clearly believed that it would still be the graduated
series of demissions envisaged by Monsignor Marella, which would start
immediately60. To clarify this point, Bishop Castanier wrote directly to Cardinal
Fumasoni-Biondi at Propaganda Fide.
The reason for his confusion was that at an earlier meeting of the Bishops (on
the 11th of September) the gradual solution was discussed, as was the idea,
championed by Bishop Doi, that all of the Bishops and Heads of Missions should
submit their resignations at the same time and immediately. They requested the
advice of Propaganda Fide or at least confirmation that across the board resignations
were what Rome required of them. The response of Propaganda Fide, delivered by
telegram on the 23rd of September, was the message communicated by Monsignor
Marella to Bishop Castanier on the same date: demission should be ‘little by little
(and) by stages’61. Despite the fact that, as Bishop Castanier acknowledged ‘leading
Catholics believe total demission is a sine qua non’ for the Catholic Church in Japan,
it would appear that Rome did not entirely agree. The source of this lack of
agreement probably lay in the reasons used in favor of general demission: ‘1) Japan
is a power of the first order (and) shouldn’t have foreigners in charge of anything –
Catholics are obstinate; 2) If they demit, maybe the missionaries can stay [to foster
good relations with other countries]; 3) The Bishops have agreed (!) so they should
keep their word; 4) Not to demit would raise the possibility of schism’62. In
particular the last reason, because it seemed like a threat on the part of the Japanese
government and maybe on the part of elements in the Catholic Church in Japan
itself, no doubt disposed Propaganda Fide to a slightly less conciliatory line.
However, the decision had been effectively removed from the hands of
Propaganda Fide as well. After the meeting of the 11th of September, and without
waiting for confirmation from Rome, Bishop Doi had informed the Japanese
government (and announced in a Japanese Catholic newspaper) that it would be a
general demission63. Bishop Castanier agreed to submit his demission (which would
have been required under either plan) in order to save Bishop Doi’s embarrassment,
though clearly suspicious of the way in which Bishop Doi had conducted himself
during the whole affair. The first demissions (Hiroshima, Kyoto, and Urawa
[Saitama]) were received immediately, but even that was not a smooth process. After
having resigned, Monsignor Ambrose Leblanc (of Urawa) then had second thoughts
when he began to suspect that it was Bishop Doi rather than the Japanese
government who was behind the general demissions strategy. This, along with the
telegram from Propaganda Fide, made him call the whole general demissions plan ‘an
invention’ and even led to him questioning the validity of demissions made under
these circumstances64. Bishop Castanier was under increasing pressure to resign,
Bishop Chambon visited him to urge him to do so in October, noting that this was
59 Letter of Monsignor Marella to Bishop Castanier 23/09/1940 in papers of Bishop
Castanier.
60 Letter of Bishop Castanier to Monsignor Marella 28/09/1940 in papers of Bishop
Castanier.
61 Telegram of 23/09/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.
62 Memorandum of Bishop Castanier to Bishops Doi and Chambon n/d but probably
October 1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.
63 Letter of Bishop Castanier to Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi 25/10/1940 in papers of Bishop
Castanier. 
64 Letter of Monsignor Leblanc to Bishop Castanier 25/11/1940 in papers of Bishop
Castanier.
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what both Bishop Doi and Monsignor Marella wanted, the latter largely because of
Bishop Doi’s pre-emptive contact with the government and the press. By November,
Bishop Doi was becoming increasingly desperate and wrote to Bishop Castanier that
only he and Bishop Lemieux (The Canadian Dominican who was Bishop of Sendai)
had not submitted their resignations65. The latter had indicated his willingness to do
so but was out of the country. Bishop Castanier, in a gesture which indicated his
feelings, replied and soothed Bishop Doi with the news that he had indeed
submitted his resignation, but directly to Propaganda Fide and not to Monsignor
Marella66. This resignation was accepted in December, after a telling lag of a month,
and Fr. Paul Taguchi was appointed as his successor. He was ordained to the
episcopate on December 14th 1941 a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Osaka was the last of the Japanese dioceses to accept an indigenous bishop and it
was the last of the MEP dioceses in Japan. An era was over and clearly a period of
great challenge for the Catholic Church and the MEP in Japan lay ahead.
France surrendered to the German Armed Forces on June 22 1940 and
Marshal Pétain became Chief of State of the French government, which was allowed
to control the southern half of France from the city of Vichy. On September 27 1940,
Japan signed the Tripartite Treaty with Germany and Italy forming the ‘Axis
Alliance’. In September 1940, the Japanese Army with consent of the Vichy
government entered French Indochina where they remained in effective occupation
until 1945. In October 1940, the Thai Air Force attacked Vichy French forces in
Southeast Asia, which was followed by a ground assault in January 1941. The Vichy
French forces retaliated and gained territory but, in the resulting peace treaty of
May 9 1941 signed in Tokyo and brokered by the Japanese, these territories were all
returned. Vichy was a collaborationist state with the Axis in Europe and this was
also the case in Southeast Asia. It was not an equal partner, but a tolerated assistant
whose skills could be valuable but whose weakness was manifestly clear. This
would clearly impact on the status of the MEP in Japan.
At the opening of hostilities in Europe in September 1939 there was a total of
67 MEP priests actually living in Japan. An additional seven were out of the country
on furlough (six in France and one in the United States). With the signing of the
Axis Alliance a year later they became officially citizens of a ‘friendly’ nation, as did
the German and Italian Catholic missionaries. The Salesian Prefect Apostolic for
Miyazaki, Vicenzo Cimatti, even went so far as to compose the first ever Western
style opera in Japanese ‘Grazia Hasegawa’ to celebrate the signing of the Axis
Treaty. It was first performed in Tokyo that year67. This ‘friendly nation’ status for
these missionaries continued after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the
British and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia. Catholic and Protestant
missionaries from America and Britain (as well as Belgium and Ireland) were
subject to internment but this did not apply to the MEP68. Some missionaries from
‘enemy’ nations were interned and then deported69. In August 1942, and again in
September 1943, some of these missionaries were exchanged at sea for captured or
interned Japanese civilians, while others remained interned for the duration of the
65 Letter of Bishop Doi to Bishop Castanier 03/11/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.
66 Letter of Bishop Castanier to Bishop Doi 06/11/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.
67 Vicenzo Cimatti was born in 1879. He came to Japan in 1925. During the war he was
under virtual house arrest in Tokyo. He stayed on in Japan for a further 20 years after the
war dying there in 1965.
68 Letter of Bishop Breton to MEP Superior General 20/09/1945 in MC 571b (1945).
69 Sister Aimee Julie, With Dedicated Hearts (Ipswich [MA], 1963) 202-232.
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war. Although being from a ‘friendly’ country prevented deportation or internment,
the MEP were subject to considerable harassment and difficulty. Two were arrested
in December 1941 (Bishop Breton and Fr. Marcel Houtin)70 and imprisoned for four
months. At the same time, Fr. François-Xavier Brenguier was arrested in Saga and
imprisoned for three months71. Two missionaries had been conscripted in 1939 (Fr.
Clément Fonteneau in Vietnam and Fr. Alfred Mercier at the French Embassy in
Japan)72. All of the other missionaries were subject to various restrictions ranging
from house arrest to intensive surveillance. Frs. Frédéric Bois, Anatole Heuzet, and
Henri Léoutre were put under house arrest at the Cathedral of Fukuoka sharing
their place of residence with some Japanese police who reported their words and
actions73. Fr. Bonnet was arrested and imprisoned for 19 days, on the denunciation
of his catechist with whom he was not on good terms. The nature and extent of the
harassment varied at the whim of government officials and policemen around the
country ‘some (missionaries) were not allowed to leave their posts while others had
to leave and take refuge in the mountains’74. Father Bonnet noted that the police in
his parish of Izuka were always ‘correct’ in their treatment of him75, though the
same could not apply to the police dealing with Fr. Breton who, it seems, was
particularly disliked by them and was even physically beaten in prison. However,
even this story had a happier side as he was released on the instructions of a senior
government official, was given gifts of beer, fruit, and candies and returned to the
Cathedral of Fukuoka with a policeman to carry his bags76. The MEP continued to
function, however, and remained in groups organized by diocese.
Two things were of particular help to the MEP during the war. One was the
continued interest on the part of the Japanese government in maintaining
70 Fr. Marcel Houtin was born in 1890 and ordained to the priesthood in 1920. He served in
various positions in the Archdiocese of Tokyo where he died in 1951.
71 Fr. François-Xavier Brenguier was born in 1871. He served in various posts in Kyushu
until his death in 1946.
72 Fr. Clément Fonteneau was born in 1913 and ordained to the priesthood in 1937. After a
brief stay at Fujieda he served in the French Army until 1945. After his return from
Vietnam he served in various positions in the Diocese of Yokohama until his death in
2001. Fr. Alfred Mercier was born in 1905. He was mobilized in 1940, though he was
demobilized after three months. In May 1945 he was arrested and tortured by the police.
After his release in August 1945 he served in various parishes until his death in 1977.
73 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945. Fr. Maxime Bonnet was born
in 1878. He served in various positions in the Dioceses of Nagasaki and then Fukuoka. He retired
in 1952 and died at Shindenbaru in 1959. Fr. Frédéric Bois was born in 1887. He was
mobilized into the French Army from 1914 to 1919. On his return to Japan he served in
Kumamoto and then Fukuoka. After the end of World War Two, he served in Yahata
from 1948 to his retirement in 1975. He died in Shindenbaru in 1977. Fr. Anatole Heuzet
was born in 1870. He served at Kianousa for 18 years before he was mobilized into the
French Army in 1915. He was demobilized in 1917 and returned to Japan where he
served in a variety of positions. He died in Fukuoka in 1944. Fr. Henri LŽoutre was born
in 1907. He served in various positions before his health problems became severe. He
died in 1944.
74 Note (no date) in papers of Bishop Combaz.
75 In fact, Fr. Bonnet attempts to portray his life as a largely pleasant one with a big garden,
chickens, rabbits, goats, and bees. Despite his tendency to ‘look on the bright side’ it
would seem that life, though always uncertain, was not always unpleasant for all of the
MEP missionaries. Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.
76 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.
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diplomatic links with the Vatican. Bishop Breton believed that his release from
prison was connected to the appointment of Harada Ken (Councilor of the Japanese
Embassy in France) as the first Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican77. The other
was the continued support of the French Government that, under Marshal Pétain,
was favorable towards the Catholic Church. In fact, through the assistance of M.
Gallois at the French Consulate in Yokohama, the MEP received regular monthly
cash subventions78. While not treated by the Japanese government as favorably as
the German Jesuit missionaries (as Fr. Henri Unterwald noted)79, the help of the
Vichy government was important for the physical survival of the MEP missionaries
during these difficult times. In return, they were supportive of the requests of Vichy
for interpreters in Indochina and of saying a mass for the war dead at the special
request of Marshal Pétain80.
As opposed to this, there were two things that were particularly irksome to
the MEP during the war. The first was the attitude of the Catholic Church in Japan
towards Japanese nationalism and the wartime government. In the words of Bishop
Breton: ‘Hierarchy and clergy cooperated heartily with the militaristic and racist
elements of the country, not a single one daring to say “no” to a government official.
Lack of character, lack of principles, a real game of opportunism all through, I
should say rather of servilism (sic)’81. Following the orders of the government, the
Catholic Church had restructured itself in May 1941 as the ‘Japanese Catholic
Religious Body’ (Nippon Tenshu Kokyo Kyodan) with Archbishop Doi as its first
president. In every way, from participation in ‘pacification delegations’ to the South
Pacific and Indonesia, to making all Church buildings available for the use of the
military from offering prayers for victory at mass to official visits to State Shinto
shrines for the same purpose, the Catholic hierarchy seemed to be wholeheartedly
supportive of the war. Its numerous publications, especially those of Bishop Taguchi
of Osaka82, during this period reflect this. Bishop Taguchi was a particularly zealous
supporter of the militarist government and its actions, especially in Southeast Asia.
Archbishop Doi, though not a participant in the actual ‘pacification missions’, made
his support for the government’s actions clear in print. 
The second issue was the way in which the Japanese clergy had treated the
missionaries during the war. In the words of Bishop Breton concerning his
imprisonment ‘On the part of the native Bishop and of his clergy, there was
complete indifference, not even the least request to the competent authorities to
obtain my release or that of my fellows’83. This was reflected throughout the
country: whether out of fear, cowardice, or nationalist commitment, the Japanese
clergy did nothing to help the missionaries and distanced themselves as far as
possible from them. The support of the Japanese clergy for the ‘pacification
delegations’ requested by the Japanese government in 1941 and 1943 for the Pacific
77 Letter of Bishop Breton to MEP Superior General 20/09/1945 in MC 571b (1945).
78 Letter of Bishop Chambon 23/08/1944 in papers of Bishop Chambon.
79 Fr. Henri Unterwald was born in 1908 and ordained to the priesthood in 1933. He served
in various parishes in the Diocese of Osaka. He retired in 1971 and returned to Alsace.
He died there in 1998.
80 Letter of Bishop Chambon 03/09/1941 in papers of Bishop Chambon.
81 Letter of Bishop Breton to Bishop O’Hara and Bishop Heady 20/07/1946 in MC 571b
(1946).
82 Bishop Taguchi was born in 1902. He became Bishop of Osaka in 1941 and then
Archbishop in 1969. He was elevated to Cardinal in 1973 and died in 1978.
83 Letter of Bishop Breton to MEP Superior General 20/09/1945 in MC 571b (1945).
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and Indonesian territories captured by the Japanese army was not appreciated by
the MEP. This was particularly the case for Bishop Taguchi and Bishop Yamaguchi
of Nagasaki both of whom left on one such mission in August 1943, and who were
still actively involved with it in September 194584. It would take some of the
missionaries a while to adjust to this after the war was over, Bishop Breton, for
example, strongly believed that non-Japanese bishops should be brought back to
serve as moral examples to the Japanese hierarchy and Church85. Fr. Bonnet also
believed that General MacArthur would institute this course of action because of the
moral weakness shown by the Japanese86. It was not however, a piece of advice that
he intended to follow.
With the end of the war, the MEP and the Catholic Church entered a new and
very different era in Japan. A total of 16 MEP priests had died in Japan during the
war and all of the others had suffered varying degrees of hardship. Their treatment
had worsened during the last few months of the war after the defeat of Nazi
Germany and the disappearance of Vichy France. All of the missionaries had been
interned in special camps in July 1945 from which they were released after Japan’s
surrender. Now decisions had to be made about the future and the need to find a
new vision for their mission and for the Catholic Church in Japan. Whatever these
were to be, and whatever their relationship with the indigenous hierarchy was to
be, the MEP was unwilling to sever its links with Japan; links that had been forged
over nearly a century and whose quality had been severely tested. 
84 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.
85 Letter of Bishop Breton to Bishop O’Hara and Bishop Heady 20/07/1946 in MC 571b
(1946).
86 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.
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